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BETWEEN SHOW TRIALS AND SHAM PROSECUTIONS:
THE ROME STATUTE’S POTENTIAL EFFECT
ON DOMESTIC DUE PROCESS PROTECTIONS
ABSTRACT. This article examines the extent to which the International Criminal
Court inﬂuences national jurisdictions with respect to due process protections. An
analysis of two of the Rome Statute’s safeguards against failing national justice
systems, namely the admissibility criteria found in Article 17 and Article 20(3) show
that the Court’s inﬂuence may extend to domestic due process rights. The Rome
Statute’s complementarity principle leaves room for such an interpretation, inter alia,
by demanding regard to due process as recognized by international law when the
Court assesses admissibility. A liberal interpretation of this idea is known as the due
process thesis. However, the author suggests a narrower approach, only in cases of
gross violations of core fair trial rights. Then, the article examines how this moderate
form of the due process thesis might aﬀect evidentiary rules. The reason for this is
twofold. First, most evidentiary rules can be construed as a form of due process
protection, rendering them a comprehensive area of law suitable for examination.
Second, evidentiary issues are inseparable from the practical impediments with re-
spect to fact-ﬁnding, which are currently widely discussed in the international
criminal justice discourse.
I INTRODUCTION
On 19 November 2011, Libyan authorities captured Saif al-Islam
Gaddaﬁ, son of Libya’s former leader Muammar Gaddaﬁ.1 Shortly
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1 See C.Krauss andD.Kirkpatrick, LibyanFighters CatchQaddaﬁ’s Last Fugitive
Son’New York Times (NewYork, 19 November 2011) <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/
11/20/world/africa/gaddaﬁ-son-captured-seif-al-islam-qaddaﬁ-libya.html?pagewanted=
all> accessed 24 January 2012. The International Criminal Court also issued an arrest
warrant for former intelligence chief Abdullah al-Senussi. Al-Senussi was arrested at
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after Saif al-Islam’s capture and detention in Zintan provence, the
interimgovernment inTriploi announced its intention toprosecute him
domestically instead of surrendering him to the International Criminal
Court (ICC).2 Despite several attempts by Libya to have the Court’s
Surrender Request of 5 July 2011 postponed, the arrest warrant issued
by the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber I (PTC I) on 27 June 2011 remains in
eﬀect.3 On 1 May 2012, Libya’s government formally challenged the
case’s admissibility pursuant to Article 19 of the Rome Statute, asking
the Court to declare Saif al-Islam’s case inadmissible and to quash the
Surrender Request.4 The PTC is yet to render a decision on Libya’s
Article 19 application. So far, however, the Oﬃce of the Prosecutor
(OTP) seems to favor allowing Libya a chance to pursue Saif al-Islam’s
case in accordance with the general rationale behind the Court’s
complementary position vis-a`-vis national jurisdictions.
The complementarity principle in the Rome Statute of the ICC,
one of the cornerstones on which today’s international criminal jus-
tice is built, regulates the theoretical and practical division of labor
between the Court and domestic jurisdictions. While the United
Footnote 1 continued
Nouakchott airport in Mauritania on 17 March 2012 proving the numerous previous
reports of al-Senussi’s capture in Libya false. According to Libyan Deputy Prime
Minister Mustafa Abu Shagour (via Twitter), Mauritania already agreed to the
extradition of al-Senussi to Libya. However, there are no oﬃcial, independent
sources to corroborate this assertion. At the time of writing, it is therefore uncertain
whether al-Senussi is still in Mauritania and whether he will be extradited to Libya,
to France (where al-Senussi has been sentenced in absentia to life imprisonment for a
1989 airplane bombing), or surrendered to the ICC. See L. Prieur and H. al Shachi,
Mauritania agrees to Senussi extradition, Libya says’ Reuters (New York, 20 March
2012) <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/20/us-libya-senussi-idUSBRE82J0X
120120320> accessed 8 April 2012; Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddaﬁ and Abdullah
Al-Senussi (Application on behalf of the Government of Libya pursuant to Article 19
of the ICC Statute) ICC-01/11-01/11 (1 May 2012), para. 30. Given the ambiguity
surrounding al-Senussi’s whereabouts, this article only focuses on Saif al-Islam
Gaddaﬁ.
2 See M. Simons, Hague Prosecutor Opens Door to Libya Trial of Qaddaﬁ Son
and Aide’ New York Times (New York, 22 November 2011) <http://www.nytimes.
com/2011/11/23/world/africa/hague-oﬃcial-backs-trials-in-libya-for-two-men.html?
scp=8&sq=Seif%20al-Islam%20el-Qaddaﬁ&st=cse> accessed 24 January 2012.
3 See Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddaﬁ and Abdullah Al-Senussi (Decision
Regarding the Second Request by the Government of Libya for Postponement of the
Surrender of Saif Al-Islam Gaddaﬁ) ICC-01/11-01/11 (4 April 2012), para. 19.
4 See Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddaﬁ and Abdullah Al-Senussi (Application on
behalf of the Government of Libya pursuant to Article 19 of the ICC Statute) ICC-
01/11-01/11 (1 May 2012), para. 108.
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Nations ad hoc Tribunals have precedence over national jurisdic-
tions, the ICC will only exercise jurisdiction when a state is inactive or
‘‘unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or
prosecution’’ of alleged perpetrators of core international crimes such
as war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.5 The ICC is
complementary to its domestic counterparts, creating a relationship
of vertical inﬂuence and guidance with respect to national criminal
law systems.
Saif al-Islam Gaddaﬁ’s capture, in combination with the ICC’s
arrest warrant, Libya’s plan to try him domestically and a deferential
ICC Prosecutor, raise a number of interesting procedural questions
that go beyond the conﬁnes of Saif al-Islam’s particular case.6 This
5 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, (2002) 2187 UNTS 90,
Article 17 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
6 For recent discussions among legal scholars on a number of concerns raised by
Saif al-Islam Gaddaﬁ’s case (including the relationship between the ICC, Libya and
the United Nations Security Council, the current status and eﬀect of the ICC arrest
warrant, the question whether Saif al-Islam ought to be surrendered to the ICC, and
the consequences of an Article 19 admissibility challenge in light of Article 95 of the
Rome Statute), see the following postings of Jens David Ohlin to his blog Lieber-
Code: Libya & Positive Complementarity’ (21 November 2011) <http://www.lieber
code.org/2011/11/libya-positive-complementarity.html>; Libya’s Duty to Cooper-
ate with the ICC’ (23 November 2011) <http://www.liebercode.org/2011/11/libyas-
duty-to-cooperate-with-icc.html>; Libya & The Death Penalty: Can the ICC
Complain About Too Much Punishment?’ (28 November 2011) <http://www.
liebercode.org/2011/11/libya-death-penalty-can-icc-complain.html> all accessed 20
January 2012. See also the following postings of Kevin Jon Heller to the blog Opinio
Juris: Does Libya Have to Surrender Saif to the ICC? (Answer: Yes)’ (23 November
2011) <http://opiniojuris.org/2011/11/23/does-libya-have-to-surrender-saif-to-the-
icc-answer-yes/>; Four Quick Thoughts on Justice in Libya’ (3 January 2012)
<http://opiniojuris.org/2012/01/03/four-quick-thoughts-on-justice-in-libya/>; ICC
Ducks the Article 95 Issue Regarding Gaddaﬁ’ (5 April 2012) <http://opiniojuris.
org/2012/04/05/icc-ducks-the-article-95-issue-regarding-gaddaﬁ/> all accessed 11
April 2012. And see the following postings of Dapo Akande to the blog EJIL:Talk!:
Is Libya Under an Obligation to Surrender Saif Gaddaﬁ to the ICC? Part I (What
Does the Rome Statute Say?)’ (26 November 2011) < http://www.ejiltalk.org/is-
libya-under-an-obligation-to-surrender-saif-gaddaﬁ-to-the-icc-part-i-what-does-the-
rome-statute-say/>; Is Libya Under an Obligation to Surrender Saif Gaddaﬁ to the
ICC? (Part II) Has the UN Security Council Imposed Diﬀerent Obligations of
Cooperation from the Rome Statute?’ (29 November 2011) < http://www.ejiltalk.
org/is-libya-under-an-obligation-to-surrender-saif-gaddaﬁ-to-the-icc-part-ii-has-the-
un-security-council-imposed-diﬀerent-obligations-of-cooperation-from-the-rome-
statute/>; Libya’s Obligation to Surrender Saif Gaddaﬁ to the ICC: A Follow Up’
(20 February 2012) < http://www.ejiltalk.org/libyas-obligation-to-surrender-saif-
gaddaﬁ-to-the-icc-a-follow-up/> all accessed 11 April 2012.
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article focuses only on one case-speciﬁc concern, whether Saif
al-Islam will receive a fair trial in Libya, and one general question of
greater importance: does the ICC’s complementarity regime inﬂuence
domestic due process issues?
Although many states have adopted new substantive criminal laws
under the inﬂuence of the ICC’s complementarity regime, the scope
of the Court’s authoritative guidance is disputed with respect to
procedural matters, most notably due process protections. On the one
hand, many scholars believe that the ICC’s eﬀect on this area of
domestic criminal procedure is positive. The complementarity prin-
ciple dictates regard to principles and norms of due process as rec-
ognized by international law when the Court makes an admissibility
assessment under either Article 17 or Article 20(3) of the Rome
Statute. Kevin Jon Heller calls this the ‘‘due process thesis’’.7 On the
other hand, it has been argued that such an eﬀect is beyond the Rome
Statute’s text, as well as beyond the drafters’ intentions.
This article scrutinizes critiques of the due process thesis by
assessing whether there is a legal basis for the Court’s inﬂuence
through an analysis of the admissibility grounds of Article 17 and
Article 20(3). It touches upon those aspects of the complementarity
principle that seem to aﬀect fair trial rights at the domestic level, such
as two of the Rome Statute’s due process clauses: Article 17’s refer-
ence to ‘‘principles of due process as recognized by international law’’
and Article 20(3)’s mention of ‘‘the norms of due process recognized
by international law’’. The article suggests there is room for a mod-
erate form of the due process thesis in case of ﬂagrant violations of
core elements of internationally recognized fair trial rights. The
importance of rethinking the due process thesis is shown by Saif
al-Islam’s case, the fair trial concerns that have been raised in relation
to his case and the compelling goal ‘‘to prevent a post-conﬂict free fall
into vengeance, vendetta, or victor’s justice’’.8
In order to test the potential eﬀect of the moderate due process
thesis, this article next examines that area of law where fairness in
procedure comes closest to fairness in outcome: evidentiary rules. The
7 See K. Heller, The Shadow Side of Complementarity: The Eﬀect of Article 17
of the Rome Statute on National Due Process’ (2006) 17 Criminal Law Forum 255,
255.
8 R. Teitel, The ICC and Saif: After International Intervention, Avoiding Victor’s
Justice’ (Opinio Juris, 2 January 2012) <http://opiniojuris.org/2012/01/02/the-icc-
and-saif-after-international-intervention-avoiding-victor%E2%80%99s-justice/>
accessed 17 January 2012.
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rationale for choosing this ﬁeld of law as a test area is twofold. First,
most evidentiary rules can be construed as a form of due process
protection, making it a comprehensive area of law most suitable for
the purpose of this article. Second, evidentiary issues are currently
under severe criticism in debates regarding international criminal
fact-ﬁnding, rendering them among the most contentious topics in
any due process discussion relating to the prosecution of interna-
tional crimes. Moreover, fact-ﬁnding and evidentiary problems faced
by the ICC may in turn aﬀect the standards of quality that the Court
can demand from domestic jurisdictions.
Thus, this article does not profess to present an exhaustive list of
all areas of domestic due process rights that the moderate due process
thesis may inﬂuence. Rather, the article aims at, ﬁrst, introducing the
moderate due process thesis, and second, placing it in a more tangible
context by exploring an exemplary ﬁeld of law that the suggested
narrower interpretation of the classic due process thesis may aﬀect in
the future.
II COMPLEMENTARITY AND PRINCIPLES
OF DUE PROCESS
Article 17 of the Rome Statute dictates that the ICC does not come
into play unless a state is either ‘‘unwilling’’ or ‘‘unable’’ to genuinely
prosecute and punish international crimes committed within its
jurisdiction.9 Consequently, if a state tries to shield the per-
son(s) responsible for mass atrocities by undertaking sham prosecu-
tions designed to acquit, the ICC may step in and take over the
proceedings. Article 20(3) contains a similar ground for admissibility
when national proceedings have already been concluded.10 The pro-
9 See Rome Statute (n.5) Article 17(1)(a), which reads: ‘‘Having regard to para-
graph 10 of the Preamble and article 1, the Court shall determine that a case is
inadmissible where:(a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which
has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out
the investigation or prosecution’’.
10 Ibid. Article 20(3), which reads: ‘‘No person who has been tried by another
court for conduct also proscribed under article 6, 7 or 8 shall be tried by the Court
with respect to the same conduct unless the proceedings in the other court:(a) Were
for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility for
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court; or(b) Otherwise were not conducted
independently or impartially in accordance with the norms of due process recognized
by international law and were conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances,
was inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice’’.
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vision’s ‘‘upward’’ principle of ne bis in idem vis-a`-vis the ICC does
not apply when proceedings in a national court were intended to
shield the person concerned from criminal responsibility or were
otherwise conducted improperly.11
Both provisions form exceptions to the general rule that the ICC is
barred from exercising jurisdiction where national justice systems are
engaged. However, the question remains to what extent this exception
results in the Rome Statute demanding procedural reform at the
national level, and whether not providing a defendant with basic due
process rights constitutes inability or unwillingness to prosecute
oﬀenders, or alternatively, makes a case admissible under Article
20(3).12 The due process thesis answers the latter question in the
aﬃrmative, but in its current form, the thesis has not gone without
criticism.
2.1 The Due Process Thesis: The Treaty and Critiques
The ICC may be viewed as a role model of due process, as it gives
defendants all the procedural rights enumerated in the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).13 Moreover, Article
17 of the Rome Statute, most clearly giving eﬀect to the comple-
mentarity principle, refers to ‘‘the principles of due process recog-
nized by international law’’ in its second paragraph. This seems to
underline the assumption that the ICC has a positive eﬀect on
national due process rights. As noted by scholars in Triﬀterer’s
Commentary to the Rome Statute, Article 17 may even require ‘‘an
assessment of the quality of justice from the standpoint of procedural
and perhaps even substantive fairness’’.14 Arguably, a state’s failure
11 Ibid. Article 20(3); see also C. Van den Wyngaert and T. Ongena, Ne bis in idem
Principle, Including the Issue of Amnesty’ in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta and J.R.W.D.
Jones (eds), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary,
vol 1 (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002) 724–725.
12 See for example G. S. McNeal, ICC Inability Determinations in Light of the
Dujail Case’ (2006) 39 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 325, 325;
Heller (n. 7); J. Kleﬀner, Complementarity in the Rome Statute and National Criminal
Jurisdictions (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008) 130 [hereinafter Kleﬀner,
Complementarity].
13 See Heller (n. 7) 256.
14 S. A. Williams and W. A. Schabas, Article 17: Issues of Admissibility’ in
O. Triﬀterer (ed), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court: Observers’ Notes, Article by Article (Munich, Oxford, C. H. Beck, 2008) 623.
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to guarantee a defendant due process rights, most notably basic fair
trial rights as recognized in international human rights law, makes a
case admissible under Article 17.
Heller refers to this interpretation of the complementarity princi-
ple, observing that it is widely supported,15 as the ‘‘due process the-
sis’’.16 However, he counters the thesis, phrasing the most
fundamental objection, by stating that ‘‘[p]roperly understood, article
17 permits the Court to ﬁnd a State unwilling or unable’ only if its
legal proceedings are designed to make a defendant more diﬃcult to
convict. If its legal proceedings are designed to make the defendant
easier to convict, the provision requires the Court to defer to the State
no matter how unfair those proceedings may be’’.17
Article 17’s admissibility assessment consists of a number of ele-
ments that are necessarily scrutinized in the due process thesis debate.
For instance, with respect to ‘‘inability’’, Heller notes that scholars
generally argue that a state is ‘‘unable’’ in the sense of Article 17 if it
does not guarantee a fair trial for the defendant.18 The Informal
Expert Paper on complementarity issued by the ICC’s OTP supports
this stance.19 However, Heller argues that this is an unrealistic
interpretation of ‘‘inability’’. The third paragraph of Article 17
elaborates on what constitutes an inability to investigate or prose-
cute, stating that the Court should consider whether ‘‘due to a total
or substantial collapse or unavailability of its national judicial sys-
tem, the State is unable to obtain the accused or the necessary evi-
15 See Heller (n. 7) 256; see also M. S. Ellis, The International Criminal Court
and Its Implication for Domestic Law’ (2002) 15 Florida Journal International Law
215, 221–222; J. Kleﬀner, The Impact of Complementarity on National Imple-
mentation of Substantive International Criminal Law’ (2003) 1 Journal of Interna-
tional Criminal Justice 86, 105-106 [hereinafter Kleﬀner, Substantive]; C. Stahn,
Complementarity, Amnesties, and Alternative Forms of Justice; Some Interpreta-
tive Guidelines for the International Criminal Court’ (2005) 3 Journal of Interna-
tional Criminal Justice 695, 713; C. Stahn, Complementarity: A Tale of Two
Notions’ (2008) 19 Criminal Law Forum 87, 97; C. Stahn, Libya, the International
Criminal Court and Complementarity’ (2012) 10 Journal of International Criminal
Justice 325, 344–345.
16 See Heller (n. 7) 257.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid., 259.
19 See International Criminal Court Oﬃce of the Prosecutor, An Informal Expert
Paper: The Principle of Complementarity in Practice’ (2003) <http://www.icc-cpi.
int/iccdocs/doc/doc654724.pdf> accessed 19 December 2011, 28 [hereinafter Infor-
mal Expert Paper].
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dence and testimony or otherwise unable to carry out its proceed-
ings’’.20 On the one hand, ‘‘[i]t is diﬃcult to argue that we would
ordinarily describe a functioning national judicial system that lacks
certain due process protections as one that has collapsed’ or become
unavailable’’’.21 One may argue that such an expansion of the ICC’s
jurisdiction goes beyond the intentions of the Rome Statute’s draft-
ers.22 On the other hand, demanding complete compliance with
international due process standards is not necessary. It would be
realistic to regard the lack of basic due process rights for an accused
as an inability in the sense of Article 17. Such a moderate way of
assessing ‘‘inability’’ is in line with the treaty’s text as it targets not
any lack of due process rights but a lack of even the most basic due
process protections.
The next element, part of the willingness assessment in Article
17(2)(c), provides a good argument in support of the due process
thesis as it lists the requirement that national proceedings must be
conducted independently and impartially.23 However, basing the due
process thesis on this element has also been criticized.24 The sub-
paragraph continues with a conjunctive requirement (‘‘and’’ as op-
posed to ‘‘or’’), namely that a national proceeding is also ‘‘being
conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, is inconsistent
with the intent to bring the person concerned to justice’’. One may
conclude that this is reason enough to assume that an unfair trial
designed to convict, but still with the intent to bring the person to
justice, does not constitute unwillingness on the part of a state.
However, Article 17(2)(c) leaves room for diﬀerent interpretations.
First, biased proceedings against a person other than the actual
20 See Rome Statute (n. 5) Article 17(3).
21 See Heller (n. 7) 264.
22 Ibid; see also McNeal (n. 12) 333.
23 See Rome Statute (n. 5) Article 17(2), which reads: ‘‘In order to determine
unwillingness in a particular case, the Court shall consider, having regard to the
principles of due process recognized by international law, whether one or more of the
following exist, as applicable: (a) The proceedings were or are being undertaken or
the national decision was made for the purpose of shielding the person concerned
from criminal responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court referred to
in article 5; (b) There has been an unjustiﬁed delay in the proceedings which in the
circumstances is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice;
(c) The proceedings were not or are not being conducted independently or impar-
tially, and they were or are being conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances,
is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice’’.
24 See Heller (n. 7) 260–261; Kleﬀner, Complementarity (n. 12) 130.
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perpetrator, so-called scapegoat trials meant to convict, as opposed
to sham prosecutions designed to shield and acquit, are neither
conducted impartially nor are they consistent with the intent to bring
the person concerned (i.e. the real perpetrator) to justice.25 In com-
paring the historical Justice case, in which judges, prosecutors and
oﬃcials of the Reich Ministry of Justice were found guilty of crimes
against humanity for abusing the judicial process to further the
persecution and extermination of minorities and political opponents
of the Nazi regime, one can see the ultimate consequence of the
strategy of systematically denying fair trial rights.26 Such a denial
may lead to an assessment of unwillingness under today’s ICC re-
gime. When the ‘‘person concerned’’ turns out to be the real perpe-
trator but the trial was unfair, one could still argue that such
proceedings are inconsistent with the intent to bring the individual to
justice.27
Second, it must be an extremely diﬃcult task for the Court to
determine whether a violation of due process rights took place to the
beneﬁt or the detriment of the accused.28 Consider, for example, Saif
al-Islam’s case. An assessment of whether or not he will beneﬁt from
due process abuses is not easily made at this point in time (in ad-
vance), and seems highly impractical.
The most promising element of Article 17 in light of the due
process thesis is the subordinate clause in the chapeau of the second
paragraph, to which this article refers as Article 17’s due process
clause: ‘‘In order to determine unwillingness in a particular case, the
Court shall consider, having regard to the principles of due process
recognized by international law, whether one or more of the following
exist (…)’’.29 However, this paragraph could suﬀer a similar (gram-
matical) fate, since the article’s chapeau and subparagraphs are
25 See Kleﬀner, Substantive (n. 15) 105–106 (n. 93); see also F. Gioia, Comments
on Chapter 3’ in J. Kleﬀner and G. Kor (eds), Complementarity Views on Comple-
mentarity: Proceedings of the International Roundtable on the Complementary Nature
of the International Criminal Court, Amsterdam 25/26 June 2004(The Hague, TMC
Asser Press, 2006) 112.
26 See U.S.A. v. Josef Alstotter et al. (the Justice case’), Trials of War Criminals
Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10
(Nuremberg, October 1946–April 1949), vol. III, at 1046–47; see also R. May and M.
Wierda, International Criminal Evidence (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoﬀ, 2002) 259.
27 See Kleﬀner, Substantive (n. 15) 105-106 (n. 93).
28 See Gioia (n. 25) 112.
29 Rome Statute (n. 5) Art. 17(2) [emphasis added].
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conjunctive as well.30 The subordinate clause merely provides guid-
ance as to how the Court should determine whether one of the sub-
paragraphs applies. This is not necessarily fatal to the due process
thesis, though. As noted above in relation to the willingness
requirement, the intent to bring the person concerned to justice may
be interpreted less rigidly leaving room for the due process thesis.
In sum, the fundamental objection against the due process thesis is
expressed in the conclusion that a case becomes admissible under the
complementarity regime only when defendants receive too many due
process rights, which serve as a cloak to shield the person concerned
from justice. Consequently, if a defendant is deprived of suﬃcient due
process rights, which amounts to an unfair trial to the detriment of the
individual, the case is not admissible as long as a state has the intent
to bring the person to justice. Applied to Saif al-Islam’s case, the
denial of the due process thesis leads to the conclusion that his case
will most likely remain inadmissible since Libyan authorities have
expressed nothing but eagerness to prosecute him and have shown no
intentions to shield him from a conviction or to protect him from an
actual sentence. The question whether Saif al-Islam will receive a fair
trial would be immaterial as long as the intent to bring him to justice
is present. However, while having regard for the objections to the due
process thesis elaborated upon above, this conclusion can be disputed
for the reasons following below.
2.2 Introducing a Moderate Form of the Due Process Thesis
2.2.1 Article 17’s Due Process Clause
John T. Holmes’s account of the negotiations on complementarity,
which Holmes himself coordinated in Rome in 1998, is a useful tool
for going beyond textual interpretation and looking into the drafting
history.31 An examination of the preparatory work of the Rome
Statute seems to suggest that it was not the drafters’ intention to
expand the scope of the ICC’s jurisdiction in such a way that is
reconcilable with the classic due process thesis.32 Although suggested
by some delegations, many did not believe that the absence of
30 See Heller (n. 7) 262–263.
31 See J. T. Holmes, The Principle of Complementarity’ in R. S. Lee (ed), The
International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute: Issues, Negotiations,
Results (Leiden, Kluwer Law International, 1999) 41.
32 Ibid., 50; see also Heller (n. 7) 271–273.
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national due process rights should be a ground for admissibility.33
When interpreting the drafting history stringently, one may conclude
together with opponents of the due process thesis that each element
of the Rome Statute’s complementarity principle was put in there for
good, but diﬀerent reasons.
However, there is one aspect of which the underlying reason for
inclusion is highly unsatisfactory. The subordinate clause in Article
17(2), which refers to the principles of due process as recognized by
international law, was added at the last minute in Rome as an ‘‘ele-
ment of objectivity to all the criteria of unwillingness’’.34 Delegations
worried that the ICC would be granted too much discretion in
determining whether a state was ‘‘unwilling’’ and repeatedly ex-
pressed the concern that the provision lacked objective criteria on
which the Court would base its assessment, rendering it too sub-
jective.35
Thus, it is clear that the drafters did not want the words ‘‘due
process’’ in Article 17(2) to mean complete compliance with inter-
national human rights standards. It is clear why the drafters of the
Statute added them (to add an element of objectivity), but it is not
clear what is left, if anything, of the clause’s meaning in practice.
Apparently, the drafters intentionally chose an ambiguous term in
order to allow for an assessment on a case-by-case basis. However, it
is problematic that ‘‘objectivity’’, a rather vague term in this context,
is also stated as the underlying reason for including the word ‘‘gen-
uinely’’ in Article 17. The Informal Expert Paper states that the
addition ‘‘genuinely’’ brings ‘‘a certain basic level of objective qual-
ity’’.36 Both the word ‘‘genuinely’’ and Article 17¢s due process clause
were added to guarantee more objectivity. The word ‘‘genuinely’’,
due to its placement as an adverb in Article 17(1)(a), applies to both
‘‘inability’’ and ‘‘unwillingness’’. Therefore, with respect to ‘‘unwill-
ingness’’, the objectivity requirement is added twice: once in the form
of requiring genuineness, and once in the form of requiring a regard
to the principles of due process as recognized by international law. In
essence, if every form of the due process thesis is denied, and it is
assumed that the reference to international due process principles is
absolutely limited to meaning an added element of objectivity, then
33 See Holmes (n. 31) 50; see also Heller (n. 7) 272.
34 Holmes (n. 31) 54.
35 Ibid., 53; see also Kleﬀner, Complementarity (n. 12) 90.
36 Informal Expert Paper (n. 19) 8.
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the subordinate clause in Article 17(2) is obsolete. Article
17(1)(a) already demands objectivity.
Although hardly unprecedented and perhaps even understandable
in light of the undoubtedly exhausting drafting circumstances, it is at
least problematic that the Rome Statute includes such grand words
merely to have them serve as an unnecessary safeguard. Moreover, as
will be discussed below, such an interpretation of the Statute’s due
process clauses is not in keeping with the general objective and
meaning of due process rights.
2.2.2 Due Process Rights: Objective and Scope
The conclusion that Article 17(2) is only written for the situation in
which criminal processes are abused to the beneﬁt of the suspect or
accused reveals a dichotomy. As Jann Kleﬀner states: ‘‘[t]his [con-
clusion] is diametrically opposed to the general assumption and
objective of fair trial guarantees, which are designed to protect
individuals against abuses to their disadvantage’’.37 Although not
subscribing to the due process thesis, Kleﬀner hits the nail on the
head, since the concept ‘‘due process of law’’ emerged as regulating
legal proceedings in accordance with rules and principles which
safeguard the position of the individual charged.38 It is a universally
accepted principle of international law that trials must be fair.39
Therefore, interpreting Article 17¢s due process clause as only in-
tended to prevent abuse of the criminal process to the advantage of
the accused is a contradiction in terms. It is diametrically opposed to
the general assumption and objective of fair trial guarantees, which
are designed to protect individuals against abuses to their disadvan-
tage, namely arbitrariness.
Due process and fair trial rights do not have a ﬁxed meaning in
any legal system, but they generally refer to the idea that citizens have
fundamental rights vis-a`-vis the state or the government to delimit the
latter’s power.40 In other words, these types of rights are designed to
37 Kleﬀner, Complementarity (n. 12) 130.
38 Ibid., 129.
39 See A. Cassese, International Criminal Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press,
2nd edn., 2008) 383.
40 See A. Duﬀ et al., Introduction: Towards a Normative Theory of the Criminal
Trial’ in A. Duﬀ et al. (eds), The Trial on Trial: Truth and Due Process, vol 1
(Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2004) 24; See also Taxquet v. Belgium App no 926/05
(ECtHR, 31 January 2009); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341
U.S. 123 (1951) 162–163.
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(a) protect the individual from a greater power, namely the govern-
ment or the state, and more speciﬁcally, (b) prevent arbitrary abuse of
that power. As noted above, the Informal Expert Paper states that
the word ‘‘genuinely’’ brings a certain basic level of objective qual-
ity.41 The Paper continues that although human rights standards may
still be relevant for assessing whether national proceedings are carried
out genuinely, the ICC is not a human rights court, nor is its role to
demand perfect compliance with international human rights stan-
dards.42 According to the authors of the Informal Expert Paper, this
does not mean that human rights standards play no role at all, since
‘‘(…) human rights standards may still be of relevance and utility in
assessing whether the proceedings are carried out genuinely’’.43
Taking internationally recognized fair trial principles into account
does not mean that the ICC would turn into a human rights court (an
often stated counterargument). The drafters did not intend the Court
to be the type of human rights body we know from international
human rights law, but this does not mean human rights will not play
a role. Domestic fair trial rights are a valid concern, as shown by Saif
al-Islam’s case, and said counterargument should not paralyze the
complementarity debate. Furthermore, a certain role for human
rights within the complementarity framework is in line with the Rome
Statute’s Article 21, which states that the application and interpre-
tation of law by the Court must be consistent with internationally
recognized human rights.
2.2.3 A Process-Oriented Approach
Interpreting Article 17 to make cases admissible only where the
criminal process is being abused to the beneﬁt of the accused, sug-
gests that the Court’s unwillingness assessment is one focusing on
result, not process. The inclusion of the phrase ‘‘with an intent to
bring the person concerned to justice’’ makes this suggestion rea-
sonable, as it seems to imply that a result that shields the person
concerned from justice would be impermissible.44 However, as stip-
ulated before, biased proceedings against persons other than the
41 See Informal Expert Paper (n. 19) 8.
42 Ibid., 8–9.
43 Ibid.
44 See L. Waldorf, ‘‘A Mere Pretense of Justice’’: Complementarity, Sham Trials,
and Victor’s Justice at the Rwanda Tribunal’ (2010) 33 Fordham International Law
Journal 1221, 1266.
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actual perpetrator are not consistent with the intent to bring the
person concerned, i.e., the real perpetrator, to justice either.45
Moreover, although the language of the Rome Statute is slightly
ambiguous on this matter, Article 17 clearly refers to ‘‘proceedings’’
as opposed to any type of result, such as a ﬁnal verdict or sentence.
The authors of the Informal Expert Paper conﬁrm that the assess-
ment required by Article 17 ‘‘should be based on procedural and
institutional factors, not the substantive outcome’’,46 which suggests a
more objective assessment consistent with the due process thesis.
In this context, ‘‘the intent to bring to justice’’ may be deﬁned as
striving to assure that the actual perpetrator is arrested and tried in
court.47 Heller declares ‘‘justice’’ synonymous with conviction, but
reads into the word, as it is used in Article 17, the successful con-
clusion of criminal proceedings against the actual perpetrator. ‘‘Jus-
tice’’ per se can mean conviction in some instances. For example, the
Oxford English Dictionary deﬁnes justice as alternatively, inﬂiction
of punishment, legal vengeance on an oﬀender, capital punishment or
execution.48 But a diﬀerent and broader deﬁnition applies here.49
Indeed, deﬁning the intent to bring to justice as ‘‘to do someone
justice’’ stretches beyond the limits of Article 17.50 However, jumping
ahead and deﬁning it as synonymous with conviction incorrectly la-
bels the unwillingness assessment as one of result. In Article 17, the
focus is on the proceedings. Therefore, the meaning of justice ought
to be understood as prosecuting a person by arresting him and trying
him in court.
A criminal process designed to acquit, where an abundance of due
process rights serves as a cloak that shields the person concerned
from justice, may be diﬃcult to prove.51 However, so may a scape-
45 Supra Section 2.1.
46 Informal Expert Paper (n. 19) 14.
47 See Oxford English Dictionary (2nd edn, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1989;
online version June 2011); see also Kleﬀner, Complementarity (n. 12) 151–152; M.
Scharf, The Amnesty Exception to the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal
Court’ (1999) 32 Cornell International Law Journal 507, 525; cf.Heller (n. 7) 261–262,
assuming that the intent to bring to justice is synonymous with the intent to obtain a
conviction, instead of deﬁning justice as submitting a person to the administration of
law or a judicial proceeding.
48 See Oxford English Dictionary (n. 47).
49 See Scharf (n. 47) 525.
50 See Kleﬀner, Complementarity (n. 12) 152.
51 See Waldorf (n. 44) 1266.
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goat trial designed to convict. The Informal Expert Paper addresses
these diﬃculties by providing a list of factors that may be indicative
of a non-genuine use of proceedings, which includes a regard for fair
trial rights.52 For instance, one of the items mentioned by the
Informal Expert Paper is the ‘‘[l]egal regime of due process standards,
rights of the accused, [and] procedures’’.53 If the admissibility
assessment were one of result, it would entail the Court making a
(preliminary) guilt-innocence assessment beyond the scope of the
complementarity principle.54 One scholar rightly notes in this respect
that the Court’s Prosecutor, who is the ﬁrst on the ground to make an
initial assessment of local regimes in light of the complementarity
principle, has an obligation pursuant to Article 54(1)(a) of the Rome
Statute ‘‘[i]n order to establish the truth, extend the investigation to
cover all facts and evidence relevant to an assessment of whether
there is criminal responsibility under this Statute, and, in doing so,
[to] investigate incriminating and exonerating circumstances equal-
ly’’.55
Objectifying the unwillingness assessment by making it one of
procedure makes sense for a more practical reason as well. As stip-
ulated above when discussing the meaning of ‘‘the person con-
cerned’’,56 it would be very diﬃcult for the Court acting under Article
17 ‘‘to determine ex ante whether a violation of the principles of due
process occurred to the detriment or to the beneﬁt of the accused’’.57
One may argue that the denial of the due process thesis results in
an assumption of guilt. Again, consider Saif al-Islam’s case. Will the
ICC not step in unless Libya is suspected of providing Saif al-Islam
with an abundance of due process protections that prevent a genuine
prosecution and conviction? Regardless of the unattractive message
that would send to the world, in this scenario Saif al-Islam would
(already) be assumed a guilty person beneﬁtting from a sham pros-
ecution. However, the main reason for including the due process
clause and the word ‘‘genuinely’’ in Article 17 of the Rome Statute
was to add a certain amount of objectivity to the admissibility
assessment. In essence, the presumption of innocence is the right that
52 See Informal Expert Paper (n. 19) 28–31.
53 Ibid., 28.
54 See Gioia (n. 25) 112.
55 Ibid.
56 Supra Section 2.1.
57 See Gioia (n. 25) 112.
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most objectiﬁes the criminal process, and therefore, it comes to mind
as one of the due process rights recognized by international law that
the Court must take into account. Given that Article 17 requires a
process-oriented approach, as opposed to a result-oriented approach,
the presumption of innocence seems to play a role here as an addi-
tional conﬁrmation that the Court’s assessment must be objective. If
the person concerned is not presumed innocent, or even assumed
guilty, an internationally recognized principle of due process is not
being taken into account. Such a system moves closer to Herbert
Packer’s well-known Crime Control Model, in which the presump-
tion of guilt ‘‘is basically a prediction of outcome’’.58
It has been rightly suggested that ‘‘a trial falling short of inter-
national standards of fairness [is] contrary to the very purpose of
holding international trials’’.59 More appropriate for a model court
as ambitious as the ICC is a system resembling Packer’s Due Process
Model, even in preliminary assessments like that which Article 17
demands. Such a model is supported by not only the very objectives
pursued by creating the ICC but also, as the analysis of Article 17 and
its due process clause shows, the text of the Rome Statute itself.
2.2.4 Article 20’s Due Process Clause
After the due process clause had been accepted relatively easily
regarding Article 17(2), the drafters believed it should also be in-
cluded in Article 20(3) in order to secure the same type of objectivity
when the Court considers deviation from the ne bis in idem princi-
ple.60 However, oddly enough, the words were not precisely dupli-
cated. The due process clause in Article 20(3) reads, ‘‘in accordance
with the norms of due process recognized by international law’’ as
opposed to the principles of due process as it is phrased in Article 17.
Nevertheless, there is no indication that the due process clause in
Article 20(3) should be read or interpreted diﬀerently than the clause
as found in Article 17(2). Delegations were satisﬁed to borrow
strongly from the compromise already achieved on Article 17, since
ne bis in idem is part of the complementarity principle. A reference to
it is in fact incorporated in Article 17(1)(c).61 Moreover, the rest of
the provision’s language is almost identical to Article 17¢s wording,
58 H. L. Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process’ (1964) 113 University of
Pennsylvania Law Review 1, 12.
59 May and Wierda (n. 26) 260.
60 See Holmes (n. 31) 59.
61 Ibid., 58.
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which made it widely acceptable for inclusion in Article 20(3).62 It is,
therefore, reasonable to assume that the rationale behind both due
process clauses is the same, despite fairly careless drafting.
Still, the inclusion of (approximately) the same phrase in Article
20(3) may seem slightly puzzling to some. Commentators noted the
striking diﬀerence from the ne bis in idem principle as incorporated in
the Statute of the Yugoslavia Tribunal.63 The latter only refers to
national proceedings that were not independent and impartial and
were intended to shield the accused from justice, while the Rome
Statute’s ne bis in idem principle also refers to the norms of due
process as recognized by international law. Given the drafter’s
intentions in including a due process clause in Article 17 and the wide
consensus among them to copy the phrase into Article 20, we must
assume that the deviation from the Yugoslavia Tribunal’s Statute was
an intentional one. Therefore, the ICC’s assessment under Article
20(3) can go in both directions: against or in favor of the accused.64
From the point of view of chronological continuity this makes sense.
Once domestic proceedings have come to an end, Article 17 is no
longer applicable. However, the Rome Statute’s drafters wished for
the same safeguards to apply at this later stage.65
Article 20(3) also clearly refers to ‘‘proceedings’’. Although the
Informal Expert Paper on complementarity does not cover Article 20,
it is reasonable to assume that, in light of the similarities between
Article 17 and Article 20(3), the provision demands a similarly
objective assessment focused on the process, not the substantive
outcome. At ﬁrst blush, this may seem less logical in relation to the ne
bis in idem principle. However, if the Court could only look at the
substantive outcome, and not the proceedings as a whole, states
would essentially be more likely to be in the clear once proceedings
62 See Rome Statute (n. 5) Article 20(3), which reads: ‘‘No person who has been
tried by another court for conduct also proscribed under article 6, 7 or 8 shall be
tried by the Court with respect to the same conduct unless the proceedings in the
other court:(a) Were for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal
responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court; or(b) Otherwise were
not conducted independently or impartially in accordance with the norms of due
process recognized by international law and were conducted in a manner which, in
the circumstances, was inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to
justice’’.
63 See Van den Wyngaert and Ongena (n. 11) 725.
64 See I. Tallgren and A. R. Coracini, Article 20: Ne bis in idem, in Triﬀterer
(n. 14), 694–695.
65 See Holmes (n. 31) 59.
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are concluded. They would have too much freedom in setting up
sham and show proceedings, as long as they speed things along, if the
Court lacks the actual competence to adequately step in at all stages
of national proceedings (Kompetenz Kompetenz).66
2.2.5 The Moderate Due Process Thesis: Which Rights?
It has already been mentioned that while demanding complete
compliance with all fair trial rights recognized by international law is
unrealistic, it is viable to demand adherence to basic due process
rights.67 This is where the moderate due process thesis deviates from
the classic due process thesis. The Rome Statute’s principle of com-
plementarity allows for such a reduced form of the due process thesis,
but the Statute does not identify which due process rights Article 17
and 20(3) refer to. However, as the norms and principles of due
process need to be recognized by international law, the most logical
place to ﬁnd these rights is in international human rights treaties.
In order to establish which of these internationally-found rights
are basic fair trial rights, we may look at the underlying idea of a fair
trial or due process, which is captured in the belief that not only does
a citizen need protection from the state, but also that there is some
kind of ‘‘inner morality’’ to criminal proceedings.68 There are six core
elements to this idea of a fair trial, which have been usefully sum-
marized by Mireille Hildebrandt using international documents such
as the European Convention on Human Rights69: (1) the judge is
impartial and independent; (2) the trial is public; (3) the defendant
will not be punished without a legal ﬁnding of guilt (the presumption
of innocence); (4) there is an equality of arms between prosecution
and defense; (5) the judgment will be based on evidence presented in
court (a principle of immediacy, connected with a normative prefer-
ence for oral testimony); and (6) the proceedings are based on a right
of confrontation.70 Jens David Ohlin provides a similar inventory
containing ‘‘a basic level of due process [rights] universally recognized
66 See Van den Wyngaert and Ongena (n. 11) 724–725.
67 Supra Section 2.1.
68 See A. Duﬀ et al., The Trial on Trial: Towards a Normative Theory of a Criminal
Trial, vol 3 (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2007) 51.
69 See M. Hildebrandt, Trial and Fair Trial’: From Peer to Subject to Citizen’ in
A. Duﬀ et al. (eds), The Trial on Trial: Judgment and Calling to Account, vol 2
(Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2006) 25; see also Duﬀ et al. (n. 68) 51.
70 See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Individual
Freedoms, (1950) 213 U.N.T.S. 221, Article 6.
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among civilized nations,’’71 codiﬁed in the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights.72
It must be noted that the idea of a fair trial has been further
internationalized with the realization of the international criminal
tribunals and the permanent ICC. At these courts, ‘‘the dominant
idea is perhaps less that of the individual protection than that the
international community should be seen to be acting according to
demonstrable principles of fairness’’.73 This underscores that the
ICC, as a role model of due process,74 should extend its inﬂuence to
national due process rights where the abovementioned basic rights
are not granted.
Whether domestic authorities grant basic due process rights will
need to be assessed on a case-by-case basis. The six core elements
summarized by Hildebrandt provide an excellent starting point for
assessing whether national justice is failing or has failed dramatically.
Based on a realistic execution of the moderate due process thesis,
only gross violations of the six core elements of basic due process
rights would make a case admissible under the ICC’s complemen-
tarity regime. Part III will address such assessments in more detail.
2.2.6 Practice: Moving Towards the Moderate Due Process Thesis
Despite skepticism of the due process thesis and concerns for its
impracticality, neither the ICC nor the individual states seem to ex-
press adherence to some form of due process thesis as a burden; they
are generally willing to subscribe to it.75
71 J.D. Ohlin, ‘A Meta-Theory of International Criminal Procedure:Vindicating
the Rule of Law’, (2009) UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Aﬀairs 77,
93 n. 75.
72 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, (1966) 999 UNTS 171,
Article 14.
73 See Duﬀ et al. (n. 68) 51.
74 See Heller (n. 7) 256.
75 See McNeal (n. 12) 332; see also M. Delmas-Marty, Interactions Between
National and International Criminal Law in the Preliminary Phase of Trial at the
ICC’, (2006) 4 Journal of International Criminal Justice 2, 5–6, citing International
Criminal Court Oﬃce of the Prosecutor, Paper on some Policy Issues’ (4 September
2003), <http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/1FA7C4C6-DE5F-42B7-8B25-60AA
962ED8B6/143594/030905_Policy_Paper.pdf> accessed 21 December 2011.
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In relation to the ICC, Gregory McNeal notes the Court’s migra-
tion towards the due process thesis is illustrated by the Report of the
Commission of Inquiry on Darfur.76 The Commission investigated
whether Sudan was unwilling and/or unable to prosecute the alleged
perpetrators of the atrocities committed in Darfur. The Report lists six
reasons for referring the situation in Darfur to the ICC, including ‘‘the
fair trial guarantees oﬀered by the international composition of the
Court and by its rules of procedure and evidence’’,77 indeed suggesting
a migration towards the due process thesis.
Not only the ICC, but also states are moving towards a due
process thesis approach. As shown by Kenya’s application, the ﬁrst
of its kind, to the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber II under Article 19 of the
Rome Statute in March 2011, states assume that strengthening fair
trial rights and procedural guarantees are indeed amongst their
obligations under the Rome Statute.78 In the application’s second
paragraph, the government of Kenya starts its list of reforms by
pointing out that ‘‘[t]he new Constitution incorporates a Bill of
Rights which signiﬁcantly strengthens fair trial rights and procedural
guarantees within the Kenyan criminal justice system’’.79 The Libyan
authorities seem to move in this direction as well. Not only have they
repeatedly made similar statements in relation to Saif al-Islam’s fate,
assuring that Gaddaﬁ’s son will receive a fair trial,80 their recent
Article 19 application devotes over 10 paragraphs to defending the
quantity and the quality of due process protections in Libya’s crim-
inal proceedings.81 The Libyan government naturally does not con-
76 See McNeal (n. 12) 332; Delmas-Marty (n. 75) 5–6, citing Report of the
International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations’ (UN Doc.
S/2005/60, 25 January 2005), para. 648.
77 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United
Nations’ (UN Doc. S/2005/60, 25 January 2005), para. 648.
78 See Prosecutor v. Ruto et al and Prosecutor v. Muthaura et al (Application on
behalf of the Government of the Republic of Kenya Pursuant to Article 19 of the
ICC Statute) ICC-01/09-01/11-19 (31 March 2011), para. 2.
79 Ibid.
80 See e.g., Libya pledges ’fair trial’ for Saif al-Islam’ Al Jazeera (Doa, 20
November 2011) <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/11/2011112052
915845986.html> accessed 3 March 2012; Libya: Gaddaﬁ son Saif al-Islam ‘‘will
get fair trial’’’ BBC (London, 20 November 2011) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
world-africa-15810142> accessed 3 March 2012.
81 See Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddaﬁ and Abdullah Al Senussi (Application on
Behalf of the Government of Libya purusant to Article of the ICC Statute) (n. 4),
paras. 56–67.
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ﬁrm the due process thesis while it understandably does not make the
uncongenial argument of denying the thesis either. But it (perhaps
unintentionally) articulates a moderate form of the due process thesis:
‘‘[i]t is not the function of the ICC to hold Libya’s national legal
system against an exacting and elaborate standard beyond that
basically required for a fair trial’’.82
III THE MODERATE DUE PROCESS THESIS
IN CONTEXT: EVIDENTIARY RULES
The moderate due process thesis entails the ICC approaching situa-
tions objectively (refraining from any preliminary guilt/innocence-
assessments), focusing on the proceedings, and determining whether
one of the six core fair trial elements has been so grossly violated that
it warrants a case’s admissibility. In Saif al-Islam Gaddaﬁ’s case, the
following questions may be asked: has the accused already been
brought before an impartial and independent judge? Does he have
access to counsel and other recourses, and has he been informed of
the charges against him to allow an equal opportunity to prepare his
defense? Will his trial be public, and will he get the opportunity to
examine witnesses against him?
These questions show that the moderate due process thesis would
have an eﬀect on certain aspects of domestic evidence law, as evi-
dentiary rules comprise a fair amount of the six core elements of a
fair trial discussed above.83 This section explores how due process
rights are related to evidentiary rules, placing the moderate due
process thesis in a more concrete context. Certain practical issues
cannot be ignored here. The search for the truth, which is intimately
connected to both due process rights and evidentiary rules, is an
area currently heavily under debate in relation to international
crime prosecutions. Today’s international criminal tribunals expe-
rience many evidentiary diﬃculties in the form of fact-ﬁnding
impediments. These challenges may be relevant as a correctional
factor to the Court’s admissibility assessment in cases of substan-
dard due process protections.
82 Ibid., 99 [emphasis added].
83 Supra Section 2.2.5.
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3.1 Evidentiary Rules as Due Process Protections
Evidence may be deﬁned as relevant, i.e. material and probative, infor-
mation put before a court to establish a fact in question.84 Evidentiary
rules identify and govern how this information is used at trial.85 Obvi-
ously, a judgment must be fact-based to be fair. As a tool for accurate
fact-ﬁnding, evidentiary rules guarantee procedural fairness through
identifying and governing the information presented at trial. In other
words, ‘‘[e]vidence is that area of criminal justice which comes closest to
linking fairness in procedure with fairness in outcome’’.86
Fair trial rights prevent miscarriages of justice and set boundaries
on truth-ﬁnding.87 These boundaries do not necessarily stand in the
way of the search for the truth: ‘‘(…) while eﬀective prosecutions
without too many barriers caused by principles of due process may
lead to more convictions (…) they may not lead to accurate re-
sults’’.88 One may argue that respecting individual rights even con-
tributes to truth-ﬁnding. Due process rights comprise the structural
protection that is designed to produce the correct outcomes and to
make the correct culpability determinations.89 Accordingly, due
process rights have a direct eﬀect on the search for the truth, as they
are designed to ensure that the prosecution does not have an unfair
advantage and taint the outcome of the trial, potentially causing the
innocent to be convicted.90
The rules created to ensure procedural fairness directly aﬀect
criminal proceedings with respect to the admission and consideration
of evidence.91 Evidence and due process are intimately connected in
84 See May and Wierda (n. 26) 2; see also M. C. Bassiouni, Issues Pertaining to the
Evidentiary Part of International Criminal Law’ in M. C. Bassiouni (ed), Interna-
tional Criminal Law: International Enforcement, vol 3 (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoﬀ
Publishers, 3rd edn., 2008) 581.
85 Ibid.
86 M. Stevens, Due Process of Law: Procedural and Substantive Issues’
<http://faculty.ncwc.edu/mstevens/410/410lect06.htm> accessed 21 December 2011.
87 See C. Buisman, M. Bouazdi and M. Costi, Principles of Civil Law’ in K.
Khan, C. Buisman and C. Gosnell (eds), Principles of Evidence in International
Criminal Justice (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010) 16.
88 Ibid., 14.
89 See Ohlin (n. 71) 94, 109.
90 Ibid.
91 See Bassiouni (n. 84) 593; see also J. D. Jackson and S. J. Summers, The
Internationalization of Criminal Evidence: Beyond the Common Law and Civil Law
Traditions (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012) 5.
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two ways. First, evidentiary rules are intended to regulate the use of
information in court, while due process protections act as the checks
and balances for this use. Consequently, due process rights can be
seen as the main rationale behind evidentiary rules. Second, eviden-
tiary rules may be viewed as the most obvious remedy for the
infringement of due process rights, for instance the exclusion of any
evidence obtained as a result of a due process violation.92 Either way,
the main goal of both sets of rules, evidence and due process, is
ﬁnding the truth and generating the correct outcomes.
Because of the close connection between evidentiary rules and due
process rights, the moderate due process thesis may aﬀect domestic
evidence law through those types of evidentiary rules that can be
construed as a form of due process protection. The presumption of
innocence, one of the six core elements of procedural fairness enu-
merated by Hildebrandt, as well as one of the key principles gov-
erning the application of the burden of proof,93 may be viewed as the
main link between due process rights and evidentiary rules. Addi-
tionally, the following fair trial notions and rights consist of evi-
dentiary rules, possibly causing the ICC to inﬂuence domestic
evidence law through the principle of complementarity: (1) the
equality of arms principle, consisting of rights such as access to evi-
dence, equality in resources and means, including the right to counsel,
the right to be present at trial, the right to be informed promptly of
the charges, which includes the right to adequate time and facilities to
prepare for trial and the right to disclosure, and related to the right to
translated documents94; (2) the right to an expeditious trial and to be
tried without undue delay, allowing for judicial powers such as setting
the number of witnesses, determining the time available to the parties
for presenting evidence, and exercising control over the questioning
of witnesses95; (3) the right to a public trial, ensuring that justice is
also seen to be done, but also related to dilemmas of witness pro-
tection, anonymous witnesses, and other protective measures for
witnesses96; (4) the right to remain silent or the ‘‘right to lie’’ — in a
common law system the accused has a right to remain silent but may
choose to testify under oath, while in a civil law system the accused
92 See Bassiouni (n. 84) 597; see also May and Wierda (n. 26) 295.
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has no right to remain silent and may be questioned, but is not under
oath, and therefore, has a ‘‘right to lie’’97; and (5) the right to examine
or have examined witnesses against him.98
If one or more of these evidentiary rules are too ﬂawed or absent
from a national criminal justice system, this could result in a gross
violation of one of the core fair trial elements. However, the mere
determination that a certain rule is absent or unsound should not
suﬃce. As Gideon Boas notes, ‘‘[t]he nature of war crimes and their
prosecution makes measures otherwise frowned upon in domestic
criminal justice systems less egregious: retrospective extension of
criminal provisions, extended jurisdiction, more relaxed evidentiary
provisions may be considered appropriate and necessary (…)’’.99
Diﬀerent standards may apply when dealing with international
crimes.100
3.2 Correction Factor: International Crimes and Fact-Finding
There exists a caveat in relation to international crime prosecutions
due to some practical diﬃculties. Naturally, the primary goal of any
criminal trial is to determine whether a particular accused is guilty of
the charges brought against him.101 However, the unique features of
international criminal trials create numerous evidentiary chal-
lenges.102 Criminal evidentiary rules have ‘‘had to synthesize the rules
97 Ibid., 289.
98 Ibid., 284–288.
99 G. Boas, War Crimes Prosecutions in Australia and other Common Law
Countries: Some Observations’ (2010) 21 Criminal Law Forum 313, 327; see also May
and Wierda (n. 26) 267, noting that ‘‘[i]n domestic common law courts, a question
has arisen whether there should, in principle, be a relaxation of the technical rules of
evidence in favor of the defense in war crimes trials, in order to ensure maximum
protection against unjust conviction’’.
100 Cf. Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddaﬁ and Abdullah Al-Senussi (Application
on behalf of the Government of Libya pursuant to Article 19 of the ICC Statute)
ICC-01/11-01/11 (1 May 2012), para. 94 (‘‘Even this Court with its considerable
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101 See Bassiouni (n. 84) 581, 589; see also Ohlin (n. 71) 93.
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to be found in these [domestic] laws and adapt them to the particular
circumstances of the international criminal trial’’.103
The ﬁrst challenge these trials face is caused by the fact that evi-
dence gathering is extremely diﬃcult when dealing with mass atroc-
ities due to the violent nature as well as the great magnitude of the
situation under investigation. The scope of trials dealing with inter-
national crimes is much greater than those dealing with domestic
crimes, causing a need for the rules to be adapted to ﬁt the size of
these trials.104 Secondly, in some instances the temporal and geo-
graphical distance from the scene of the crime may cause problems in
addition to those of evidence gathering. Gathered evidence may be
less reliable. And ﬁnally, the contextual elements of the crimes—the
intent of the perpetrator, the context of a widespread attack, the
context of an international armed conﬂict, etc., —give rise to evi-
dentiary challenges, for these aspects are often diﬃcult to establish in
court.105
Most if not all of these features are typical of trials where inter-
national crimes are prosecuted, whether in a domestic court or at an
international tribunal, whereas they will be much less common in, or
even completely absent from, trials prosecuting a ‘‘regular’’ domestic
crime. Libya, for instance, is still coming to grips with the violence
that took place in large parts of the country.106 Local prosecutors and
investigators will face considerable challenges, as undoubtedly the
ICC would as well, in gathering evidence. The crime scene encom-
passes most of the country, which has not yet recovered from
Gaddaﬁ’s decades-long reign or the recent ﬁghting, while the scope of
the suspected crimes is tremendous compared to a simple domestic
crime.
It is important to note that the assumption that international
criminal trials are at least capable of determining who did what to
whom during mass atrocities has been severely challenged in recent
103 May and Wierda (n. 26) 2.
104 See Bassiouni (n. 84) 581.
105 See for example N. A. Combs, Evidence’ in W. Schabas and N. Bernaz (eds),
Routledge Handbook of International Criminal Law (London, Routledge, 2010) 323;
D. Vandermeersch, Prosecuting International Crimes in Belgium’ (2005) 3 Journal of
International Criminal Justice 400, 411.
106 In early 2012, there were still reports of violence breaking out in parts of Libya.
See for example L. Stack, Pro-Government Libyan Militia Routed From a Qaddaﬁ
Bastion’ New York Times (New York, 24 January 2012) <http://www.nytimes.
com/2012/01/25/world/africa/pro-government-libyan-militia-routed-from-qaddaﬁ-
bastion.html?_r=1&scp=3&sq=libya&st=cse> accessed 25 January 2012.
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years.107 Nancy Amoury Combs, for instance, has shown that
international fact-ﬁnding is like gluing together grains of sand.
Observing that prosecutors at today’s international tribunals rely
almost exclusively on eyewitness testimony,108 she describes the
numerous problems haunting the reliability of witnesses.109 Interna-
tional criminal proceedings suﬀer from inaccurate fact-ﬁnding not
only due to educational, linguistic, and cultural impediments but also
because of witnesses perjury and errors in translation and investiga-
tion. Although domestic criminal jurisdictions are in a better position
to tackle some of these problems (for instance, a possible Libyan
prosecution of Saif al-Islam Gaddaﬁ will most likely not be thwarted
by linguistic or cultural impediments), domestic courts are bound to
face some of the same challenges. Moreover, political factors can
distort fact-ﬁnding in domestic jurisdictions, especially when trials
are conducted in the same jurisdiction where the mass atrocities took
place. This could be an issue of concern in Saif al-Islam’s case, in
addition to the expected challenges of trying a case in a post-conﬂict
Libya, because tensions between the interim government and sup-
porters of the late Muammar Gaddaﬁ have not yet subsided.110
When prosecuting core international crimes, domestic courts will
inevitably apply their own evidentiary rules. These can diﬀer con-
siderably between jurisdictions. The Anglo-American common law
system and the Roman-Germanic civil law system are rather unalike
in this respect; evidentiary rules play a signiﬁcant role in a common
law trial mostly because of the presence of a jury, while a civil law
trial is generally much less constrained by evidentiary rules. Conse-
quently, rules diﬀer from legal system to legal system, from country
to country, and even from state to state within one legal system.111
Nevertheless, certain evidentiary rules, as they relate to basic due
107 See for example N. A. Combs, Fact-Finding Without Facts: The Uncertain
Evidentiary Foundations of International Criminal Convictions (Cambridge, Cam-
bridge University Press, 2010); A. Zahar, Witness Memory and the Manufacture of
Evidence at the International Criminal Tribunals’ in C. Stahn and L. van den Herik
(eds), Future Perspectives on International Criminal Justice (The Hague, TMC Asser
Press, 2010) 602.
108 See Combs, ibid., 6.
109 Ibid., 21 et seq.; see also L. van den Herik, A Quest for Jurisdiction and an
Appropriate Deﬁnition of Crime; Mpambara before the Dutch Courts’ (2009) 7
Journal of International Criminal Justice 1117, 1130–1131.
110 See Stack (n. 106).
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process protections, can be found in most legal systems in one form
or another. For instance, the right of an accused to examine or have
examined witnesses against him is one of the core elements of a fair
trial and it can be found, albeit in varying forms, in the evidentiary
rules of most legal systems of the world.112 Moreover, the ICC is not
the only international institution that has to deal with such (domes-
tic) diﬀerences. All the major international human rights treaties and
their judicial bodies have had to deal with similar national diver-
gences.
This article has established that the moderate due process thesis
has a real and signiﬁcant role to play when it comes to domestic
proceedings. As shown by section III, the next step would be to
ensure that the fact-ﬁnding and evidence debates within the context
of domestic proceedings are conducted in compliance with the com-
plementarity regime of the Rome Statute.
IV CONCLUSION
Saif al-Islam Gaddaﬁ’s case shows that the due process thesis dis-
cussion is still an important one. Fair trial concerns have been raised
in relation to his case while local authorities seem eager to take ac-
tion. However, the due process thesis as it stands is too broad. It is
not in line with the Rome Statute’s text or its drafters’ intentions.
Moreover, a liberal application of the classic due process thesis in
admissibility determinations is unrealistic. It would swamp the ICC
with cases the Court was never meant to deal with. This does not
mean that the due process thesis discussion ought to be dismissed.
Although the mere lack of certain domestic fair trial rights should
not be enough to make cases admissible under Article 17 or Article
20(3), there is a limit to what the Court can ignore. Instead of tar-
geting every possible ﬂaw in national due process protections, the
moderate due process thesis focuses on core fair trial elements. These
fundamental elements translate more universally to national juris-
dictions without turning the ICC into a traditional human rights
body. This would allow the Court to send an important message to
112 See May and Wierda (n 26) 284–285; see also R. D. Friedman, The Con-
frontation Right Across the Systematic Divide’ in J. Jackson et al. (eds), Crime,
Procedure and Evidence in a Comparative and International Context: Essays in
Honour of Professor Mirjan Damasˇka (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2008) 262; C.
M. Rohan, Rules Governing the Presentation of Testimonial Evidence’ in K. Kahn
et al. (n. 87); Jackson and Summers (n. 91), 24.
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the world: there is no justice without basic protection of the rights of
the accused.
How strict should the ICC’s assessment be with respect to evi-
dentiary due process protections? Questions like these are food for
future discussion with respect to the practical execution of the
moderate due process thesis. National jurisdictions cannot be ex-
pected to meet higher standards than those asked of an international
court or tribunal. Proving an international crime, as opposed to
proving a domestic crime, is more challenging because of two fun-
damental diﬀerences: what needs to be proven is unique, i.e. the
contextual elements typically found in international crime deﬁnitions,
and how it needs to be proven is diﬀerent—the practical circum-
stances leading to a high reliance on eyewitness testimony while the
crime scene usually encompasses a post-conﬂict territory. When
scrutinizing prosecutions and trials involving international crimes,
these evidentiary challenges as well as other fact-ﬁnding impediments
must be included in the equation for a fair admissibility assessment
under the Rome Statute’s complementarity regime.
This article has not suggested a radical change in the Court’s
admissibility determinations. It has proposed a process-oriented ap-
proach that is realistic in practice and cautious in its implementation.
Perfect compliance with all international human rights standards is a
utopian goal even for countries not torn up by violence. Yet, no
defendant should be left to a Kafkaesque fate.
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